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JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE CLEAN AIR
AMENDMENTS OF 1970t
WILLIAM V. LUNEBURG *
LOUISE M. ROSELLE**
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (1970 Amendments) 1 radi-
cally restructured the preexisting federal and state programs for air
quality improvement and, in so doing, created an elaborate adminis-
trative procedure for attainment of air quality goals. This procedure
was complicated by Congress' determination to utilize a collabora-
tive federal-state approach to solving the nation's air pollution
problems. 2
 Finally, Congress determined that the health hazards
posed by air pollution were so severe that it had to establish strict
timetables for taking action to abate those threats. 3
This article examines only one aspect of the administrative
scheme of the 1970 Clean Air Amendments: the availability of
judicial review of various actions of the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) taken pursuant to the 1970 Amend-
ments. The discussion focuses on those provisions relating to
attainment and maintenance of the national ambient air quality
standards through the establishment and enforcement of air im-
plementation plans. The first section briefly outlines the statutory
scheme of the 1970 Amendments as a basis for the discussions that
t The views expressed herein are those of the authors. They do not represent the views
of the EPA or any other agency.
* A.B., Carleton College, 1968; J.D., Harvard University, 1971. Associate, Tenney &
Bentley, Chicago, Ill. The author formerly was an attorney in the Enforcement Division,
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
** B.S., Ohio State University, 1969; J,D.,' Ohio State University, 1972, The author is
an attorney in the Enforcement Division, EPA, Region V.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970). Various technical amendments to this legislation were
made by § 302 of the Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-157, § 302, 85 Stat. 464.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A) (1970).
667!
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
follow. The next section examines section 307(b) 4 of the 1970
Amendments, which forecloses judicial review of various issues at
the stage where enforcement of air pollution regulations is being
sought by federal and state governments and by private citizens. Its
statutory history, constitutionality and related problems are dealt
with in turn. The third and final section briefly details those circum-
stances in which other pre-enforcement judicial review should be
available to prospective defendants, issues subject to that review,
and the desirability of granting stays of the effectiveness of enforce-
ment orders.
Many of the questions dealt with here have been confronted in
cases which have arisen under the 1970 Amendments. It is a basic
premise of this article that such issues should be disposed of in a
manner which is not only fair to the parties against whom enforce-
ment is sought but also consistent with attainment of the national air
quality goals established by the 1970 Clean Air Amendments.
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Essential to an understanding of the discussions which follow is
a brief description of the statutory scheme established by the 1970
Amendments for the prevention and control of air pollution.
In considering amendments to the previous air quality legisla-
tion, Congress was aware in 1970 that air pollution posed a severe,
pervasive and growing threat to the nation's health and welfare that
could only be satisfactorily overcome by swift and. effective action. 5
It was the sense of urgency engendered by this realization which, in
the final analysis, contributed more than any other single factor in
fashioning the legislation which became law on December 31, 1973.
Action to attain healthful air quality across the nation by the middle
of the decade of the 1970's was to be taken by the states, or the
federal government in case of default by the states, in accordance
with a strict timetable.
The Administrator of the EPA, the federal agency responsible
for administration and enforcement of the Clean Air Act, was re-
quired to establish, within 120 days after enactment of the 1970
Clean Air Amendments, national ambient air quality standards 6 for
various air contaminants 7 based on so-called air quality criteria. 8
4
 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1970). For the text of this section, see text at note 35 infra.
5
 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1970); S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1970).
6
 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
7
 As of this date national air quality standards have been established for six pollutants:
carbon monoxide; hydrocarbons, photochemical oxidants, sulfur oxides, nitrogen dioxide and
particulate matter. See 36 Fed. Reg. 22,384 (1971), as amended, 38 Fed. Reg. 25,678 (1973).
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Primary standards were to describe levels of concentration of the
pollutants in the ambient air 9 above which adverse health effects
had been identified; 1 ° and secondary standards were to specify those
concentrations above which adverse effects on the public welfare
were known or anticipated to exist." Within nine months after the
promulgation of the standards, the states were required to adopt,
after reasonable notice and public hearings, and submit to the EPA
plans for the implementation, maintenance and enforcement of the
standards throughout their respective jurisdictions. 12 The states
could adopt plans more stringent than necessary to attain the na-
tional air quality standards. 13 The Administrator was required to
act by approving or disapproving each plan or portion thereof
within four months of submittal." Approval was required if a plan
satisfied certain specific criteria set forth in section 110(a)(2) of the
Act.. 15 For the purposes of this article, the most significant of such
criteria is that which mandates that plans must provide sufficient
stationary and/or mobile source controls to ensure (1) the attainment
of the primary standards as expeditiously as practicable but no later
than three years from the date of plan approvaP 6 and (2) the
secondary standards within a reasonable time.' 7 Thereafter, the
The presence of these pollutants in the air results from numerous or diverse mobile or
stationary sources. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3(a) (1970).
8 Criteria are to reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and
extent of all identifiable effects on public health and welfare which may be expected from the
presence of the pollutants in the ambient air in varying quantities. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3
(1970).
9 "Ambient air" is that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the
general public has access. 36 Fed. Reg. 22,384 (1971).
") 42 U.S.C, § 1857c-4(b)(1) (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(2) (1970). Effects on public welfare are considered to include,
but are not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man-made materials, animals,
wildlife, weather, visibility and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards
to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personai comfort and well-
being.
12
 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970). The date for submission of the original plans was
Jan. 30, 1972. The Administrator may extend the period for submission of a plan for
secondary standards for a period not to exceed 18 months from the date otherwise required for
submission of such plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(b) (1970).
23 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970).
24
 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970). The first round of approvals and disapprovals of
state plans occurred on May 31, 1972. See 37 Fed. Reg. 10,892 (1972).
11
 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i) (1970). The attainment date for primary standards is
generally May 31, 1975.
' 7 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1970). Because secondary standards would require
more stringent controls on sources than primary standards and do not impact directly on
public health, Congress has allowed the states and the Administrator more leeway for setting
the time frame for their attainment than it has in the case of primary standards. See H.R.
Rep, No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1970).
The other required provisions of an implementation plan are set forth in 42 U.S.C. §§
1857c-5(a)(2)(A) to (H) (1970).
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standards must be maintained." If a state failed to submit a plan or
submitted one which did not meet the criteria for plan approval, the
Administrator was required to promulgate a plan for the state
within six months after the date required for submission of the state
plans.' 9
The 1970 Amendments thus allowed a mere nineteen months
from their enactment for establishing the administrative regulatory
mechanism for the attack on air pollution. 20 Thereafter the controls
were required to be implemented and the health-protective primary
standards attained within three years, unless the necessary technol-
ogy for compliance was not available (and various other stringent
requirements met), in which case the Administrator was permitted
to extend that period for no more than three additional years. 21
At the heart of an implementation plan are the emission control
regulations for stationary and mobile air pollution emission sources.
These generally demand constant emission control in terms, for
example, of pounds of pollutant emitted per ton of process weight or
per million BTU of heat input of fue1. 22
 Whether they are adopted
by the state and approved by the EPA or promulgated by the EPA
where a state has failed to act, these regulations are part of the body
of federal law enforceable by the EPA 23 and private citizens. 24
Federal enforcement of implementation plans is initiated by the
issuance of a notice of violation to the source of the emission. 25 If
the violation of the implementation plan continues for more than
thirty days after the EPA's notification, the Administrator may issue
an order after an informal conference with the source, 26 requiring
compliance with the implementation plan, 27 or he may commence a
civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or tempor-
18
 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970).
28 The EPA has not kept strictly to the schedules set out in the 1970 Amendments. Some
promulgations to correct defects in state plans have been up to a year late. See, e.g., 38 Fed.
Reg. 12,698-99 (1973) (new source review regulation for Indiana), later retracted in part, 39
Fed. Reg. 4662-63 (1974) (because of state submission of a partially acceptable new source
regulation). See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(e), (0 (1970).
22 For illustrative regulations, see, e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 22,406-08 (1971).
23 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (Supp. I 1971).
24 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
25 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1) (1970). Where a state is not enforcing its plan, the require-
ment of a 30-day notice is eliminated. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(2) (1970). Civil and criminal
sanctions apply immediately to violations of an approved plan committed during such periods.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-8(b)(2)(A), -8(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. I 1971).
26 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(4) (1970).
27 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1) (1970).
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ary injunction. 25 Criminal penalties of up to $25,000 per day of
violation and imprisonment for up to one year attach to knowing
violations 29 of a plan requirement" or EPA order31 committed at
the expiration of the thirty day notice period.
Moreover section 304 of the 1970 Amendments 32 authorizes any
person to commence a civil action to enforce the requirements of a
federally approved or promulgated plan after giving the Adminis-
trator, the state in which the violation occurs, and the source of the
violation sixty days notice. 33 The purpose of this provision was to
encourage, as well as to supplement state and federal efforts at
enforcement. 34
II. SECTION 307: FORECLOSURE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of various actions of the Administrator pursuant
to the 1970 Amendments is dealt with in section 307(b) of the
Amendments, which provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator
in promulgating any national primary or secondary am-
bient air quality standard . . . may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia. A petition for review of the Administrator's action in
approving or promulgating any implementation plan under
section [110] . . . may be filed only in the United States
Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Any such
petition shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such
promulgation or approval, or after such date if such peti-
tion is based solely on grounds arising after such 30th day.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which
review could have been obtained under paragraph (1) shall
not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal pro-
ceedings for enforcement. 35
28 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(3)(2)(B) (Supp. 1 1971). Such relief is also available for violations
of EPA orders issued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 	 1857c-8(a)(1) (1970).
29 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(1) (1970).
36 42 U.S.C, § 1857c-8(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. I 1971).
31 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(1)(13) (1970).
32 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
33 The federal district courts have jurisdiction over such actions without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
Moreover, given the lack of statutory language and legislative history indicating an intent on
the part of Congress to make this jurisdiction exclusive, it would seem that such actions can
be brought in state courts. See Luneburg, Federal-State Interaction Under the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 637, 663 (1973),
" See S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 36-39 (1970).
35 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1970). Several hundred suits have been filed under this
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Not since the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 36 has Con-
gress explicitly limited judicial review of administrative action in
such a manner as it apparently has in this provision. A prospective
defendant is given only a limited opportunity to obtain judicial
review of certain issues prior to the time enforcement is sought and
is foreclosed from litigating such issues in enforcement actions com-
menced against him. Given the strong tradition of judicial scrutiny
of administrative action, 37 such a drastic limitation on the availabil-
ity of judicial review should be given effect, if constitutional, only to
the extent that Congress can be said to have clearly intended the
result. 38
 The most appropriate way to begin an examination of
section 307(b), therefore, is to attempt to discern the legislative
intent and then to examine, with whatever guidance there exists in
the case law, the constitutionality of a provision interpreted in
accordance with that intent.
A. Legislative History of Section 3070)
A characteristic of the federal air pollution enforcement
mechanism first established in 1963 and expanded in 1967 was its
capacity for—indeed, its encouragement of—lengthy administrative
delay prior to the initiation of court actions for abatement. 39 Even at
section, many challenging the EPA's approval or promulgation of implementation plans. A
listing of many of these cases is found in 3 E.L.R. 10022-30, 10090, 10133 (1973).
36
 Act of Jan. 30, 1942; ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23. See note 82 infra for the provision of this act
similar to § 307(b)(2) of the 1970 Amendments.
Section 509(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33
U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. Il 1972), contains provisions for judicial review modeled on § 307(b) of
the Clean Air Act.
37
 See L. 'Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 336 (1965); 4 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 28.07, at 31 (1958). Both of these commentators find that the
case law exhibits a presumption of the right to judicial review. This presumption is embodied
• in § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). To the extent that §
307(b)(2) is interpreted to preclude review, however, the Administrative Procedure Act cannot
provide an independent basis for review. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(I) (1970).
" See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Professor Davis has noted that the literal words of a statute, no matter now clear and
unequivocal, are seldom a reliable guide as to how the courts will interpret a provision
restricting judicial scrutiny of the legality of agency action. 4 K. Davis, supra note 37, §§
28.01, .14, at 2, 68. See, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local I3oard No. 11, 393
U.S. 233 (1968) (where the Court allowed a pre-enforcement challenge to a selective service
classification in the face of § 10(b)(3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, the literal
language of which seems to prohibit any judicial review of a classification prior to the criminal
prosecution).
The enforcement procedures of the 1963 Clean Air Act, Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, were contained in § 5, 77 Stat. 396. First, a conference of the
governmental instrumentalities concerned with the pollution was to be called, followed by the
issuance of recommendations for abatement. If adequate action to solve the problem was not
taken in six months, a public hearing was to be held to consider what measures were
necessary. If action was not taken to abate the pollution within six months thereafter, the
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the judicial stage, the system provided ample opportunities for pro-
longing attempts to finally resolve air pollution problems by permit-
ting the enforcement court to make almost a de novo review of
matters which may have been extensively discussed and decided
earlier at the administrative leve1. 40 Thereafter orders were to be
entered "as the public interest and the equities of the case"
required. 4 '
Confronted with the slow pace of air pollution control efforts at
the state and federal levels42 and the mounting evidence of health
federal government could institute an action, for civil injunction relief. Only a handful of
conferences were held under this act.
The Air Quality Act of 1967, Act of Nov, 21, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108, 81 Stat.
491, adopted the air quality standards approach which was later elaborated in the 1970 Clean
Air Amendments. States were to adopt air quality standards and plans for their implementa-
tion. If a state failed to enforce its plan, resulting in violation of the air quality standards, the
federal government could issue a 180-day warning notice to the state and source responsible.
If the violation of the standards was not corrected, the federal government could initiate an
action for civil injunctive relief. No enforcement actions were taken pursuant to these
provisions because of the slow pace of implementation plan development. See Hearings on Air
Pollution Control and Solid Wastes Recycling Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and
Welfare of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
I, at 234-37 (1970) (which describes the progress in implementing the 1967 Act).
" See Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 5(g), 77 Stat. 398 (court to give due
consideration to the practicability of compliance and the physical and economic feasibility of
securing abatement); Act of Nov. 21, 1967, : Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(c)(4), 81 Stat. 493
(court to give due consideration to the practicability and the economic and technological
feasibility of compliance). See also Bishop Processing Co. v. Gardner, 275 F. Supp. 780 (D.
Md. 1967), which held that, pursuant to § 5(g) of the 1963 Clean Air Act, the abatement
recommendations of a hearing board convened under that act were subject to review in
enforcement proceedings. Therefore the court could modify or refuse to enforce the recom-
mendations. Gardner involved an animal rendering plant which created an interstate odor
pollution problem. Delaware and Maryland had initiated attempts to abate the problem in
1959, but to no avail. The federal government intervened in 1965 pursuant to the conference
procedures of the 1963 Clean Air Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 5(c), 77 Stat.
397. Failure to obtain voluntary abatement led to the initiation of a civil injunctive action
under § 108(g)(1) of the 1967 Air Quality Act, Pub. L. No, 90-148, 81 Stat. 496 (which had
been carried over from the 1963 Act). The decision arising from that action, United States v.
Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), reiterated that the recommendations
of the hearing board were not binding on the enforcement court, though judicial review fell
somewhere between trial de novo and the traditional scope of review of administrative action.
It was not until 1970 that the Bishop Processing Company was forced to close its doors. See
United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904
(1970).
41
 Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 5(g), 77 Stat. 398; Act of Nov. 21, 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(c)(4), 81 Stat. 493.
For discussions of the 1967 Act, see Martin & Symington, A Guide to the Air Quality Act
of 1967, 33 Law & Contemp. Prob. 239 (1968); O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air Quality Act of
1967, 33 Law & Contemp. Prob. 275 (1968); Comment, Air Pollution in the Marietta-
Parkersburg Area-A Case History, 32 Ohio St. L.J. 58 (1971).
42
 H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Report];
S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
Discussions regarding the slow pace of impleinentation plan development and the ineffective-
ness of prior federal enforcement efforts are contained in Hearings on Air Pollution Control
and Solid Wastes Recycling Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare of the House
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hazards posed by air pollution," Congress in 1970 embarked on an
effort to restructure the previous federal air quality legislation to
make it genuinely effective.
While the House of Representatives initially contemplated al-
lowing the states a rather large degree of flexibility in setting the
time frame for the attainment of the national air quality standards"
and therefore did not see the necessity for limiting judicial review at
the enforcement stage, 45 the Senate approved a bill which mandated
attainment of the health-related air quality standards within three
years of federal approval of the implementation plans. 46 In addition,
the Senate bill provided that petitions for review of the approval or
promulgation of air implementation plans and air quality standards
were to be filed in the court of appeals for the appropriate circuit
within thirty days of the approval or promulgation. 47
 While the bill
did not explicitly foreclose later review by enforcement courts in the
manner of section 307(b), that such was the Senate's intention is
shown by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with judicial
review. 48
 After acknowledging various recent cases on judicial re-
view of administrative action holding that preclusion thereof is not
lightly to be inferred but requires a showing of clear legislative
intent, 49 the report continued by noting:
Since precluding review ,does not appear to be war-
ranted or desirable, the bill would specifically provide for
such review within controlled time periods. Of course, the
person regulated would not be precluded from seeking such
review at the time of enforcement insofar as the subject
matter applies to him alone . . . 5 °
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2-5, 42-52,
234-37, 308, 414-40 (1970).
43 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 1.
44 House Report, supra note 42, at 8 (state implementation plans were required to
provide for the attainment of the air quality standards in a "reasonable time;" no definition of
that phrase was provided in the House bill).
45 Id. at 9.
46 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 2. Arguments in terms of economic and technological
feasibility were not to be considered relevant as bases for delaying the early attainment of
healthful air quality levels. See id. at 2-3.
47 S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 308 (1970), reprinted in Senate Report, supra note 42,
at 125.
48 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 40-42.
49
 The Senate Report refers to Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1952);
United States v. McCrillis, 200 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1952); Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274
F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959). See also Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
30
 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 41.
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The clear implication of this statement is that at least certain
issues (i.e., those in which the subject matter does not apply to the
defendant alone) must be raised, if at all, within thirty days of final
administrative action on the air quality standards and implementa-
don plans." The reasons for so restricting the opportunity for judi-
cial review are not difficult to discover.
By confining review to the courts of appeals and requiring that
all challenges to the approval or promulgation of standards and
plans be filed within thirty days after such approval or promulga-
tion, the Senate was endeavoring to improve the chance for attain-
ing health-related air quality standards within the strict three-year
deadline mandated in the bill. 52 Without such a provision, many
polluters would be encouraged to wait until federal or state en-
forcement was initiated or imminent and then attack the validity of
the applicable regulations on substantive and/or procedural grounds.
Further, to the extent that a court in either a pre-enforcement
challenge or an enforcement proceeding would strike down the air
quality standards and/or implementation plan, the process for im-
plementation plan development 53 would have to be reactivated in
whole or in part. Moreover, differing decisions in various district
courts would not only create great confusion among sources as to
what was expected of them but also artificial competitive advan-
tages and thus a certain amount of economic dislocation. With the
plan thus in limbo, pollution sources might suspend compliance
efforts, and, indeed, might be justified in suspending their com-
pliance if there was a chance that the new plan would contain
different or more stringent control' requirements. Had the challenge
been raised in an action filed immediately upon promulgation of the
standards or of the approval of the plan, and had the promulgation
or the plan approval been vacated thereafter, there might have been
sufficient time to remedy the alleged defects and implement the plan
within three years of the date of the original approval of the plan.
Invalidation at the enforcement level, however, might leave
insufficient time to repromulgate, let alone expect compliance with,
the controls. Moreover, without a 'provision foreclosing review of a
plan's validity at the enforcement stage, there would be no assur-
ance that some other enforcement court in the future would not
51 Such a scheme for judicial review was urged by several persons in testimony before
the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution during the hearings preceding the
enactment of the 1970 Amendments. Hearings on Air Pollution Before the Subcomm. on Air
and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1239, 1272
(1970).
S2 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 23, 41.
53
 See text at notes 5-20 supra.
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invalidate the new plan and therefore start the process all over
again. 54
The system of judicial review provided by the Senate bill was
of course no guarantee against some delay in the implementation of
the air quality standards. 55
 However, it was an essential mechanism
for reducing such delay as much as possible.
The intentions of the Senate Bill's framers to limit issues which
could be raised at the enforcement stage is further confirmed in the
Senate Report's discussion of the bill's provision authorizing citizen
suits for enforcement' of emission regulations. 56It is therein noted:
Section 304 would not substitute a "common law" or
court-developed definition of air quality. An alleged viola-
tion of an emission control standard, emission requirement,
or a provision in an implementation plan, would not re-
quire reanalysis of technological or other considerations at
the enforcement stage. These matters would have been
settled in the administrative procedure leading to an im-
plementation plan or emission control provision. There-
fore, an objective evidentiary standard would have to be
met by the citizen who brings an action under this section
57
.	 .	 .
Resolution of many issues affecting the validity of air quality
standards and implementation plans may require tremendous re-
sources in terms of expert knowledge. To permit litigation of such
54
 Furthermore, to the extent that there is no mechanism for limiting issues which can be
raised in the enforcement forum, the possibility of extended litigation at that stage is
magnified and this may threaten attainment of the air quality standards within the three-year
deadline even if the plan is eventually upheld.
55
 For example, the Administrator's approval of the Ohio and Kentucky implementation
plans was recently vacated on procedural grounds in a § 307 proceeding. Buckeye Power, Inc.
v. EPA, 481 F. 2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973). As a result, more than a year after the original approval
of the plans, they are unenforceable by the federal government and compliance by many
pollution sources appears not to be forthcoming.
It might be argued that, when a plan is struck down in a § 307 challenge, the three-year
time frame for attaining the primary standards starts to run from the time when the EPA has
approved or promulgated a new plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A) (1970) might be so
interpreted though it is not at all clear whether Congress intended this result. Yet even if this
interpretation is accepted, § 307(b)(2) serves the purpose of insuring that the air quality
standards will be attained as expeditiously as practicable without delays caused by litigating §
307 issues at the enforcement stage.
" S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 304 (1970), reprinted in Senate Report, supra note 42,
at 122-23.
57
 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 36. The foreclosure provisions of 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-5(b)(2) (1970) apply to "civil or criminal enforcement" which would include citizen suits
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(I) (1970) for enforcement of implementation
plans. Accord, Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 6 E.R.C. 1147
(D. Del. 1973) (§ 307(b)(2) applies regardless of whether the plaintiff (citizen) or defendant
(polluter) attempts to litigate § 307 issues in enforcement action).
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issues in enforcement suits brought: by private citizens who would
rarely possess the financial ability to muster the necessary technical
assistance would effectively deter the institution of the very type of
action which the Senate, and later the Congress in enacting section
.304 of the Amendments," sought to encourage. 59
By acceding to the conference committee's report, 6° the House
thereby accepted both the three-year time limit for attaining primary
air quality standards" and the authorization of citizen suits. 62 Sec-
tion 307(b) as finally enacted merely made explicit what the previous
Senate Report had clearly intended as a safeguard for these two
provisions—that certain issues were not to be reviewed by the
enforcement court in actions brought by the federal government or
by private citizens.
While "clear and convincing evidence" of a legislative intent to
preclude review at the enforcement stage therefore exists, the ques-
tion arises as to the scope of section.307's foreclosure of review. The
Senate Report indicates that, where the "subject matter" applies to
the defendant alone, the enforcement court would be at liberty to
review the issue. 63 What this means is far from clear. Perhaps the
distinction attempted to be drawn is between so-called legislative
and adjudicative facts, 64 the former having to be litigated, if at all,
in a section 307 proceeding and the latter left open for review at a
later stage. Adjudicative facts pertain to a particular party and its
activities while legislative facts are those more generally
applicable. 65 Stated differently, the distinction is between the gen-
eral validity of the regulation and its applicability to a particular
case. 66 Not only is such a distinction subject to problems of
ambiguity, 67 but also acceptance of it as reflecting the intent of
Congress could in an untold number of cases cause the very prob-
lems that section 307(b) was designed to avoid—namely, prevention
of the attainment of the primary standards within the three-year
period or as soon thereafter as possible and undue hindrance of
5 ' 42	 § 1857h-2 (1970).
59 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 36-39.
60 H.R. Rep. No, 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1970).
6 ' Id. at 45.
62 Id. at 55-56.
63 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 41.
64 See 1 K. Davis, supra note 37, 	 7.02.
.65 Id. at 413.
66 For example, a power company admits that sulfur dioxide stack gas cleaning is
technologically feasible in many or most instances; however, in its case, the difficulties
preventing installation of such a control device are insuperable because of peculiarities in the
design and location of its plants.
67 See Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 503 (1970).
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citizen enforcement. An adequate procedure for raising and litigat-
ing issues affecting the validity of implementation plans "as applied"
to the individual source can be provided prior to the time enforce-
ment is sought."
It is submitted, therefore, that an interpretation of section
307(b).that would not foreclose the enforcement court from consider-
ing issues related to the validity of the implementation plan regula-
tion "as applied" in a particular case runs so strongly counter to the
legislative goals of the 1970 Clean Air Amendments that it should
not be adopted. In fact, in a case which involved the first enforce-
ment action under the 1970 Amendments, the court dismissed as
unsubstantial the argument that a distinction should be drawn be-
tween a challenge to a regulation as generally applicable and' one
attacking the regulation as applied to the objecting party. 69
 '
The question of whether an issue' is foreclosed from considera-
tion at the enforcement stage should instead be answered by deter-
mining, first, whether the issue could have been raised and decided
in a section 307(b) proceeding, and, second, whether the defendant
had an adequate opportunity to present his claims for decision in the
administrative and judicial process provided prior to the enforce-
ment action. 7 ° The Senate Report's concern for preserving the right
of a defendant to raise issues where the "subject matter" applies to
the defendant alonen can be interpreted to refer, inter alia, to those
cases in which the defendant contests the facts on which the Ad-
ministrator based his notice of violation and/or subsequent order, 72
the form of order, and the legality of the procedures leading to the
issuance of the notice of violation and order." Such matters could
61
 See text at notes 107-15 infra.
69
 Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del.),
remanded, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). In that case the
validity of a sulfur dioxide regulation of the State of Delaware was unsuccessfully attacked as
unnecessarily burdensome on the petitioner Getty. The district court replied that "a party
must have standing to secure judicial review and in a very real sense any challenge to the
validity of a regulation is a challenge to the regulation as applied to the objecting party." 342
F. Supp. at 1014. For further discussion of this case, see text at notes 102-04 infra,
7° For an examination of the adequacy of the administrative and judicial procedures for
litigating issues related to the approval and promulgation of implementation plans, see text at
notes 105-41 infra.
1 ' Senate Report, supra note 42, at 41.
u Accord, Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 355-56 (3d
Cir. 1972) (where the court noted that no dispute existed regarding the underlying facts
supporting the Administrator's compliance order and therefore the case presented no issues
which could not have been raised in a § 307 proceeding).
13
 For other non-307 issues which can be raised in pre-enforcement and enforcement
review, see text at notes 164-84 infra.
The Senate bill provided for federal issuance of orders to abate violations of implementa-
tion plans together with civil actions to cure violations of any such orders. Criminal sanctions
were also specified. The orders could, however, he challenged by actions instituted in district
678
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970
not be raised and litigated prior to the initiation of the enforcement
action.
B. Constitutionality. of Section 307(b)
While the case law has not provided a clear definition of the
constitutional limits of congiessional power to restrict the opportu-
nity for judicial review of administrative action, 74 there appears to
be sufficient authority to support the conclusion, though perhaps
qualified in certain respects, that section 307(b)'s foreclosure of judi-
cial review of certain issues in the enforcement forum is constitu-
tional as applied to both criminal and civil proceedings regardless of
whether the air quality standards dr implementation plans are chal-
lenged on constitutional or statutory grounds.
Section 307's restriction on the enforcement court's jurisdiction,
forbidding consideration of the validity of the regulation whose
enforcement is sought, together with the short time period within
which any pre-enforcement challenge to the air quality standards
and implementation plans must be filed, are the aspects which
present peculiar constitutional Problerns. In Yakus v. United
States," a statutory provision limiting judicial review in almost the
identical manner was challenged.
Yakus arose under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942
(EPCA), 76 a wartime measure involving criminal indictments for the
willful sale of wholesale cuts of beef at prices above those pre-
scribed by regulation. The statute provided sixty days following
issuance of a maximum price regulation within which challenges of
its validity could be made before the Price Administrator, 77 whose
decision was reviewable exclusively by the Emergency Court of
Appeals" with certiorari to the Supreme Court. 79
 Though aware of
the promulgation of the regulation prior to the expiration of the
appeal period, 80 the defendants filed no protest but instead chal-
courts at the polluting sources' initiative. There was no explicit limitation with regard to the
issues which were to be reviewable in such a proceeding. See S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §
116 (1970), reprinted in Senate Report, supra note 42, at 97-98. Such a proceeding in district
court would be an adequate forum to litigate the narrow range of issues referred to in the text.
There is no reason to believe that the Senate intended to permit the examination there of
issues touching the validity of an air implementation plan which could have been raised in a §
307 challenge.
74
 See L. Jaffe, supra note 37, at 381-89; 4 K. Davis, supra note 37, § 28.18.
75
 321 U.S. 414 (1944). Comments on this case are contained in Noel, Federal Rent
Control, 18 Temp. L.Q, 477 (1944); Quill; Judicial Review and the Price Control Act, 24
S.U.L. Rev. 250 (1944),
76
 Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, as amended, Act of Oct. 2, 1942, ch. 578, 56
Stat. 765.
77 Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 203(a), 56 Stat. 31.
76 Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 204(a), 56 Stat. 31.
79
 Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 204(d), 56 Stat. 32.
" 321 U.S. at 435.
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lenged the validity of the regulation on statutory and constitutional
grounds in the enforcement proceeding. 8 ' The Supreme Court up-
held the convictions. In so doing, it upheld the provision of the Act
which (1) removed jurisdiction from the enforcement court to con-
sider the validity of the price regulation for violation of which
sanctions were being sought 82 and (2) provided the sixty-day time
limit for challenging a price regulation. 83
The Court explained its decision in terms of the power of
Congress to define jurisdiction of the inferior federal and state courts
on federal questions and to create courts to exercise the judicial
power. 84 It emphasized that the failure to exhaust previous adminis-
trative and judicial remedies could foreclose later judicial review,
however, only to the extent that the defendants had had a reason-
able opportunity to be heard and to present evidence." Having
failed both to pursue the prior opportunity for administrative and
judicial relief and to persuade the Court of the inherent inadequacy
of that procedure,86 the defendants were without a remedy. 87
There are two principal objections which have been urged
against the result reached in Yakus. First, it has been argued that it
is an unconstitutional abridgement of the judicial power for Con-
gress to require a court created under Article III of the Constitution
to decide a case and at the same time to disregard the possibility that
81 Id. at 419. At trial, the petitioners attempted to introduce evidence that the regulation
did not conform to the standards of the Act and that it deprived them of property without due
process of law. The trial court excluded the evidence as irrelevant because of the foreclosure
provision, quoted in text at note 82 infra.
82 Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 204(d), 56 Stat. 33, which provided in pertinent part:
The Emergency Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court upon review of judg-
ments and orders of the Emergency Court of Appeals, shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued under section 2, of
any price schedule effective in accordance with the provisions of section 206, and of
any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule. Except as provided in
this section, no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power
to consider the validity of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to stay,
restrain, enjoin, or set aside, in whole or in part, any provision of this Act authoriz-
ing the issuance of such regulations or orders, or making effective any such price
schedule, or any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to
restrain or enjoin the enforcement of any such provision.
83 321 U.S. at 435.
84 Id. at 443.
85
 Id. at 434-35, 446.
86 Id. at 435.
52 For commentary supporting the result in Yakus, see Nathanson, The Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942: Administrative Procedure & Judicial Review, 9 Law & Conternp. Prob.
60 (1942); Hyman & Nathanson, Judicial Review of Price Control: The Battle of the Meat
Regulations, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 584 (1947). For further discussions of the legality of § 204(d), see
Reid & Hatton, Price Control and National Defense, 36 IR. L. Rev. 255 (1941); Comment, 37
Ill. L. Rev. 256 (1942).
680
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970
the regulation to be enforced might be unconstitutional. 88 The an-
swer to this argument would seem to be that a court created by
Article III did in fact sit prior to the enforcement action to hear
challenges to the regulations on constitutional and other grounds.
Secondly, it is urged that, in criminal cases, removing the
question of the regulation's validity from the jury and/or trial court's
consideration is a violation of the right to jury trial guaranteed by
section 2 of Article III of the Constitution89 and the right to a speedy
and public trial by jury protected by the Sixth Amendment. 9° To the
extent the defendant has challenged the regulation under the special
statutory provision and was unsuccessful, he still has not been
afforded the procedural protections of a criminal trial (e.g., proof
beyond a reasonable doubt)" in contesting the validity of the regula-
tion. To the extent that he fails to pursue the prior opportunity for
judicial review, he is foreclosed from any judicial determination of
one of the issues which is crucial to proof of his guilt. 92
 On the other
hand, neither Article III nor the Sixth Amendment explicitly defines
the universe of facts which must be open to consideration in the
criminal trial. As Professor Jaffe has pointed out, in the case of an
administrative regulation, the individual is commanded to do or
cease from doing' an act and only then does a refusal become
pimishable. 93 It is the refusal to obey that is the criminal act which
is open to consideration at a trial accompanied by the full panoply of
procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Yakus v. United States does' not stand alone in supporting the
constitutionality of section 307(b). Professor Davis has supported the
proposition that constitutional rights may be forfeited by failure to
as 321 U.S. at 467-68 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See also McLaren, Can a Trial Court of
the United States Be Completely Deprived of the Power to Determine Constitutional Ques-
tions?, 30 A.13.A.J. 17 (1944).
Rutledge found such an argument to bar on grounds of unconstitutionality the foreclosure
provision of the Emergency Price Control At as applied to criminal proceedings, though not
civil proceedings, unless the regulation attacked was invalid on its face. See Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 525-29 (1944) (concurring opinion). Rutledge fails, however, to
articulate convincing bases for such distinctions.
89 U.S. Const. art III, § 2.
90 U.S. Coast. amend. VI. For such arguments, see Rutledge's dissent in Yakus, 321
U.S. at 478-89 (the opinion does not clearly indicate which issues are for the trial judge and
which for the jury); Fraenkel, Can the Administrative Process Evade the Sixth Amendment?,
1 Syracuse L. Rev. 173 (1949); McLaren, supra note 88; Schwartz, Administrative Law and
the Sixth Amendment: "Malaise in the Administrative Scheme," 40 A.B.A.J. 107 (1954)
(indicating that the question of validity of an order or regulation need not necessarily be one
for the jury). See also United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 174-80 (1952) (Jackson &
Frankfurter, JJ.,.dissenting); United States v. England, 347 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1965).
91 321 U.S. at 480-81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 478-79 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
93 L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 394 (1965).
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make timely assertion of them before a tribunal having jurisdiction
to determine them, finding such a view to be in accordance with
necessity and tradition. 94 Moreover, other commentators have con-
cluded that there need be only an adequate opportunity to contest
the constitutional and statutory validity of administrative action at
some point in time, and that this opportunity need not necessarily be
at the enforcement leve1. 95 In addition, civil and criminal cases have
upheld the foreclosure of review in the enforcement forum of gener-
ally applicable regulations when their validity has been attacked on
constitutional and/or statutory grounds, sometimes in the absence of
explicit statutory command to do so. 96 Further, even a greater
number of decisions have held adjudicatory orders—i.e., those di-
rected against a named individual or small group of individuals
—immune from attack in suits for enforcement when the defendants
had failed to resort to the statutorily prescribed methods of review. 97
Of course, Congress should have some reason for its decision to
preclude review at the enforcement stage, but the reported cases do
94
 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 28.18, at 97(1958),
95
 L. Jaffe, supra note 93, at 384; Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts; An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1378-79 (1953).
96
 See, e.g., United States v. Southern Ry., 380 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1967) (in an action for
civil penalties for violation of ICC emergency regulation, challenge to validity of the regula-
tion as ultra vires not allowed, given the existence of a prior opportunity provided by statute
to contest such orders which was not followed by defendant); United States v. Southern Ry.,
364 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031 (1967) (same holding as in previous
case involving generally the same circumstances, except that here the order was attacked on
statutory and constitutional-vagueness grounds); United States v. 3 7112 Dozen Packages of
Nu-Charme Perfected Brow Tint, 59 F. Supp. 284 (W.D. La. 1945), affd sub nom. Byrd v.
United States, 154 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1946) (in libel proceeding under the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, claimant was barred from contesting the factual basis for regulation
classifying certain cosmetics as adulterated since the statute provided a prior adequate
opportunity to raise such issues which was not pursued here);' United States v. Bodine
Produce Co., 206 F. Supp. 201 (D. Ariz. 1962) (given the statute's vesting jurisdiction to
decide the issue in the court of appeals, trial of criminal misdemeanor under Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act held not the proper forum for challenging validity of DDT tolerance
for lettuce as long as statutory requirements for notice and hearing were complied with in
proMulgating regulation). •
97
 See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (in action by the United States
to recover excess profits under the Renegotiation Act, failure of the defendants to petition Tax
Court for a redetermination excluded consideration in enforcement action of the coverage of
the Act, the amount of profits, and other comparable issues which could have been presented
to Tax Court); United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287 (1946) (under Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, milk handlers may not challenge in an enforcement proceeding the
validity of an order requiring payment of certain money into statutory fund but must instead
pursue statutorily prescribed method of review of orders); Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S.
549 (1944). See also Stason, Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative
Action, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 560 (1941).
The constitutional objections leveled at the result in Yakus (interference with the judicial
power and the right to trial by jury) would, if valid, seem to be equally applicable to these
cases, even though the procedures involved in the issuance of the administrative action
challenged differ (rule-making in Yakus; adjudication under the Clean Air Act). Nevertheless,
the courts have not accepted such arguments as a bar to foreclosure.
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not require such overwhelming necessity as presented in time of war
to justify foreclosure." The .elimination within three years of the
threat to the public health posed by air pollution would certainly
seem to be an adequate basis for theioreclosure provisions of section
307(b).
Neither Yakus nor any other case discovered where review was
held to be foreclosed presented a situation in which the enforcement
court was barred from considering the constitutionality of the en-
. abling statute99 or in which the regulation was unconstitutional on
its face. 1 °° The congressional histOry of section 307(b) does not
compel a reading which would bar challenges to the constitutionality
of the Clean Air Act per se, and it is doubtful whether it should be
so interpreted. 10 ' Where plans are alleged to be unreasonably bur-
densome with respect to some sources so as to amount to a denial of
equal protection of the laws or to be invalid on other grounds, their
validity will in most cases hinge on proof of scientific and/or
economic facts extrinsic to the regulations. For this reason situations
in which plans or portions thereof are invalid on their face are
unlikely to occur.
Given the status of the case laW in this area, the opinions of the
district court and the Third Circuit in the case of Getty Oil Co.
(Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 1 °2 which, implicitly at least,
upheld the constitutional validity of the foreclosure provisions of
section 307, seem to be well-founded. Getty Oil Company brought
suit to have set aside an order of the EPA issued to a power plant
which had violated the applicable federally approved sulfur dioxide
regulations of Delaware. Getty, which supplied the high sulfur fluid
petroleum coke for burning at the plant and which would therefore
be substantially affected if the power company complied with the
98 See, e.g., United States v. Southern Ry., 380 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1967) (national railway
car shortage); Byrd v. United States, 154 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1946) (protection of public from
hazardous cosmetics); United States v. Bodine Produce Co., 206 F. Supp, 201 (D. Ariz. 1962)
(protection of public from contaminated food).
99 Yakus, 321 U.S. at 429-30 (where the Cdurt refused to read the EPCA as attempting
to foreclose attacks on its constitutionality); United States v, Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940, 941 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958) (in an action for civil penalties under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 for producing and marketing wheat in excess of quota, court noted
that Congress could not prevent an aggrieved farmer from raising the question of Act's
constitutionality as a defense to the action).
'°° While the Supreme Court in Yakus was not confronted with a situation where the
regulation was unconstitutional on its face, and thus refused to indicate the result that should
be reached in such a case, 321 U.S. at 446-47, it is hard to see a distinction of constitutional
proportions between the two situations.
191 The section speaks only in terms of insulating "action of the Administrator." 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (1970).
102
 342 F. Supp. 1006 (1). Del.), remanded, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
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order, alleged as part of its challenge that the applicable air quality
standards were already being met in the vicinity of the plant and
that the enforcement of the regulation would impose an unnecessary
hardship on Getty and on the power company, at least until sulfur
dioxide stack gas scrubbing was available. 103
 The courts refused to
listen to such challenges to the Delaware regulation. Even if the
objections were valid, Getty had failed to attack the regulation in
state court when adopted by the state agency and to file a petition
for review under section 307(b). It was foreclosed from raising the
issues in a pre-enforcement attack on the EPA order or later in
judicial proceedings brought by the EPA to enforce the order.'"
C. Adequacy of Section 307(b) Review
As the previous discussion has pointed out, the constitutional
validity of section 307(b)'s foreclosure of judicial review in enforce-
ment actions of issues which could have been raised in a section 307
proceeding hinges on the adequacy of the prior opportunity to be
heard on objections to the regulation at the administrative and
judicial levels.'" Recently there has been a plethora of judicial
opinions decided which, together with the EPA's regulations, have
given some indication of the type of procedural scheme in which a
prospective defendant may raise and litigate his objections to the
validity of an implementation plan. Generally speaking, the con-
stitutional adequacy of this system of review would not appear open
to serious question. Comparison with the procedures upheld in
Yakus indicates that the procedures under the Clean Air Amend-
ments contain at least as much protection for the interests
involved. 1 °6
103
 342 F. Supp. at 1012.
104
 467 F.2d at 357-58 n.14.
1 °5
 See text at notes 94-95 supra.
100
 Under the Emergency Price Control Act, prices were established in accordance with
general criteria set forth in the Act, though the Administrator was required to give due
consideration to prices existing in certain base periods. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 2a, 56
Stat. 24. No hearing was provided prior to promulgation of a price regulation. However,
within 60 days after issuance, any person subject to a price regulation could file a protest with
the Price Administrator, setting forth his objections, affidavits and other written evidence. Act
of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 203(a), 56 Stat. 31. Within certain specified time periods, the
Administrator was required to grant or deny the protest or give notice for a hearing on the
protest or provide opportunity to present further evidence in connection therewith. Id. The
Supreme Court noted in Yakus that the administrative hearing on the protest could validly be
restricted to the presentation of documentary evidence, affidavits and briefs, at least in some
cases. 321 U.S. at 436. If the Administrator denied the protest, he was required to inform the
protestant of the grounds for his decision and of any economic data or other facts of which he
took official notice. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 203(a), 56 Stat. 31. Within 30 days
following denial of a protest, the objecting party could appeal to the Emergency Court of
Appeals, which could issue an injunction only if the regulation was not in accordance with
law, or was arbitrary or capricious. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 204(a), 56 Stat. 31. It could
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States are required by section 110(a) of the 1970 Amend-
mentsur to hold public hearings after reasonable notice prior to
their adoption of implementation plans. EPA regulations elaborate
this requirement by defining "reasonable notice" to include thirty
days notice of the date, time and place of the hearing by prominent
advertisement in the air quality control region affected.' 08 The
proposed plan is to be available for public inspection in the region
affected by the plan throughout the notice period. 109
Federal regulations do not require anything more than a legisla-
tive, or information gathering, hearing."° Decisions by the courts of
appeals have generally followed the recent trend advocated in schol-
arly writing' 11
 and cased 12 and have avoided determining the
specific procedures which are required for the state hearings. 1 t 3 The
procedures to be followed depend on a pragmatic balancing of the
various factors including the type of issues presented in terms of
their importance and complexity and the fairness to the parties
involved. 114 To the extent that the state hearing is adequate and the
Administrator considers the hearing record in making his decision to
approve or to disapprove the state plan, further solicitation of com-
ments at the federal level has been held to be unnecessary." 5
One of the more confusing issues involves the interaction of
section 307 review of an approved state plan and the various proce-
also order the taking of more evidence before the Administrator. Id. Further, review by the
Supreme Court on certiorari was permitted. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 204(d), 56 Stat. 32.
1 ° 7 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970).
108 37 Fed. Reg. 26,311 (1972).
109 Id. Such requirements are, of course, in addition to any that may be imposed by state
law. In order to reduce possible conflict between federal and state requirements, the Adminis-
trator may approve variations in the federal notice and hearing procedures if he is convinced
that the state's procedures provide for adequate notice to and participation by the public. See
id. at 26,312.
11 ° 37 Fed. Reg. 26,311-12 (1972) does not specify the type of hearing required, but the
practice has been to require no more than information-gathering hearings.
111 See, e.g., Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent De-
velopments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 Duke L.J. 51.
112 See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Walter Holm & Co. v.
Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
113 See, e.g., Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973), rev'g 352 F.
Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
114 In some cases this could result in a requirement that the hearing held on a plan
incorporate the right of cross-examination and other procedural hallmarks of the traditional
adjudicatory hearing. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.24 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973).
115 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973), But see
Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2(.1 162 (6th Cir. 1973).
Nevertheless, the EPA has recently solicited public comment on state plans prior to their
approval. See 38 Fed. Reg. 34,894 (1973) (notice of opportunity for public comment on
Indiana's new source review regulation). The procedures for federal promulgation of a plan
are generally similar to those involved in approval of a state plan, with the principal exception
that the federal, not state, government holds the hearing.
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dures permitted by state law to challenge or obtain a variance from
a state regulation. At least one court has considered the opportunity
to challenge a regulation on the state level as an element of appar-
ently some importance in determining the adequacy of the prior
opportunity for judicial review. 116
 Yet if a prospective defendant
appeals the state's adoption of a regulation by way of a non-section
307 challenge in which he could raise the same issues as in a section
307 challenge," 7
 it does not seem that invalidation of the regulation
by a state court after federal approval of the plan necessarily opens
the issue to judicial review, as one opportunity for judicial review
has been afforded, albeit at the federal level, and passed up." 8 It
has been held in one case that a state variance procedure is an
appropriate device to cure "imperfections" in a plan in the instance
of the failure of the state to hold an adequate hearing prior to its
adoption and submittal of the plan to the EPA." 9
 This result is
clearly wrong. Typically variance proceedings merely provide a
means for a source to obtain relief from the impact of a regulation
which may impose "undue burdens" in the particular case. 12° The
proceeding is not one to attack the legality of the original adoption
of the regulation. Since the issues which can be presented in the two
proceedings will necessarily differ, remitting a prospective defendant
to the variance proceeding will not provide him an adequate oppor-
tunity to challenge. the regulation."'
A further problem with this suggestion is posed by the so-called
"Getty Dilemma," which arises from the fact that the federal gov-
ernment and private citizens can bring an action to force compliance
with a federally approved plan unless the variance has been ap-
proved by the EPA as meeting the substantive and procedural
requirements on the Act. Getty states that the enforcement court
cannot consider the, grounds of the variance as a defense to the
116
 See Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 356 (3d Cir.
1972).
117 See text at notes 123-31 infra.
118
 In Clean Air Coordinating Comm. v. Roth-Adam Fuel Co., 465 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1117 (1973), petitioners brought suit in federal court to enjoin
proceedings in state court which were delaying Illinois' submission of part of its implementa-
tion plan to the EPA. The court held that the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1970), barred the action, particularly because of the EPA's authority to promulgate a plan for
a state where the state fails to submit an acceptable plan. The result is the correct one given
the facts presented. However, where a state plan has been approved by the EPA and the
30-day appeal period of § 307 has expired, a collateral attack on the state plan in the state
should not affect the enforceability of the plan by the EPA, the state and private citizens.
119
 Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973).
12° See, e.g., Conn. Admin. Regs. § 19-508-13 (Dep't of Environmental Protection,
1972).
121
 Accord, Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006, 1014
n.9 (D. Del. 1972).
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action if they could have been raised in a section 307 proceeding. If
the prospective defendant fails to obtain federal approval of the
variance prior to the enforcement action, his opportunity to obtain
relief may be effectively extinguished. 122
In a section 307(b) action, review of the Administrator's ap-
proval of a plan is conducted pursuant to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act whereby the court is authorized to decide all relevant
questions of law, to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and to determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of a
federal agency action. 123 The Administrator's action will not be set
aside unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, 124
the record for review being the information upon which the Ad-
ministrator made his decision. 125 It is submitted that, in the context
of the 1970 Amendments, the reviewing court can and should re-
view all questions of state as well as federal law presented which
pertain to the validity of an implementation plan and the regulations
122 Moreover, the EPA cannot approve any variance which would prevent the attain-
ment or maintenance of the air quality standards within the time frame established by the
Clean Air Amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857-5(a)(3) (1970). See also Luneburg, Federal-
State Interaction Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
637, 646-58 (1973).
123 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484
F.2d 1331, 1336 (1st Cir. 1973), which holds that § 307 merely designates the forum for
review and that § 304 provides the authorization for and conditions of suit. If this formulation
is followed, it will mean that every § 307 petitioner must frame the issues he raises as relating
to the failure of the Administrator to perform a nondiscretionary action or duty under the
Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(2) (1970). Issues which cannot be successfully
framed in such terms and litigated under § 307 will be open to consideration at the enforce-
ment stage.
'4 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See, e.g., Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162,
171 (6th Cir. 1973).
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard was interpreted in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), to include an administrative decision which is
not based on a consideration of the relevant factors and involves a clear error of judgment.
The "substantial evidence" test of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970) applies to cases subject to 5
U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1970) (procedures for certain types of rule-making and adjudication) or
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute. Cases have held
that EPA approval and promulgation of a plan are not subject to 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1970).
See, e.g., Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (10th Cir. 1973); Buckeye
Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 172 (6th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481
F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1973). This is because there is no requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970)
mandating that the implementation plan hearings be "on the record" in those exact words or
in similar phrases.
125 See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973). As noted in
that decision, the reviewing court has the inherent power to require that additional evidence
be taken before the Administrator. Id., at 504. The court erroneously refers to 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-5(c) (1970) as authority for this power, as that section applies only to determinations
required to be made on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing. Yet, as pointed
out in note 124 supra, decisions to approve plans are not explicitly required to be made "on
the record" and will generally not be grounded exclusively on the record of the hearing on the
plan.
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therein, i 26
 whether they are of a substantive or procedural nature.
In fact, courts have already done this. 127 Since one of the criteria for
plan approval is that the state have adequate authority to carry out
its plan,' 28
 the lack of such authority is clearly a basis for a section
307 challenge. 129
Section 307(b) does not foreclose the possibility of challenges to
standards and plans in disregard of changes in circumstances. It
allows petitions for review of standards and plans to be filed after
the thirty day appeal period lapses if they are based on "grounds
arising after such 30th day." 13 ° This provision appears to refer to
those instances where significant information newly comes to
light."'
One commentator has suggested that section 307(b)'s foreclosure
of enforcement review may be unconstitutional, at least with respect
to those persons lacking actual knowledge of the approval or pro-
mulgation prior to the expiration of the thirty day period allowed for
filing petitions for review and/or without necessary legal expertise to
mount a challenge to the regulation within the allotted time.' 32 With
126
 Cf. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(B), (C), (D) (1970).
127
 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 694-95 (8th Cir.
1973) (Iowa's new source regulation comports with federal requirements); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 892-93 (1st Cir. 1973) (Massachusetts lacks legal
authority to make emission data available to the public).
128
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(F)(i) (1970). See also 36 Fed. Reg. 22,300 (1971).
The EPA has disapproved state plans where it believed the state lacked the necessary
enforcement authority. See, e.g., 37 Fed. Reg. 10,846 (1972).
129
 Issues that might be raised in a § 307 challenge include: whether the hearings on the
implementation plan were conducted in accordance with the applicable requirements, see,
e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973); failure to comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. III 1973), see, e.g., Buckeye
Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); and the sufficiency of the technical support
for a plan (e.g., air quality data).
To the extent that a procedural defect in the development of a particular implementation
plan (e.g., no cross-examination allowed) infects the adequacy of the opportunity to raise and
litigate objections to the plan at the administrative level, though the problem was not raised in
a § 307 challenge, it might be argued that § 307(b)(2) should not foreclose raising the defect at
the enforcement stage. On the other hand, an appeal to the circuit court pursuant to §
307(b)(1) could have disposed of the issue and required correction of the defect. In effect, there
was an adequate opportunity to be heard and § 307(b)(2) should be applied in this case. Note
that in Yakus the defendants did not pursue their administrative remedies and therefore the
Supreme Court refused to say that they would have been inadequate, 321 U.S. at 434-35,
though it did suggest that any defects in procedures might have been remedied in the course of
the statutorily prescribed appeal to the courts. Id. at 434. But see United States v. 3 7/12
Dozen Packages of Nu-Charme Perfected Brow Tint, 61 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. La. 1945)
(where the enforcement court examined the adequacy of the procedures used to promulgate
regulations under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, even though it had held in 59 F.
Supp. 284 (1945) that other issues touching the validity of the regulation in question were not
open to litigation at the enforcement stage).
13 ° 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970).
131 S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42, 65-66 (1970).
132 See Note, 1973 Duke L.J. 253, 260.
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respect to the notice issue, the cases donot come to grips with the
question of what type of notice is necessary before a defendant will
be held to have forfeited his opportunity for judicial review. Some
decisions upholding forfeiture involve instances where the defendant
had actual notice of the challenged regulation or order prior to the
expiration of the appeal period or prior to the time enforcement
proceedings were instituted. 133
 In others, it appears that the defen-
dant could only be said to have been on constructive notice of the
challenged regulation or order prior to the institution of enforcement
action against him. 134
As specified by statute, publication of a regulation in the Fed-
eral Register provides constructive notice to all affected by its
contents. 135
 Approvals of implementation plans are so published,
the regulations incorporated by reference, 136 and the thirty day
period of section 307(b)(1) is considered to run from the publication
of the approval or promulgation in the Register. 137 The full text of
any federally promulgated regulation is set forth in the Register.
Even where application of this constructive notice has resulted in
serious monetary losses, the courts have adhered to it. 138
Assuming that constructive notice is not sufficient to justify a
waiver of the right to judicial review, 139 the type of measures
required by federal and state law to give public notice of hearings on
implementation plans 140 make it likely that in most cases the courts
will be able to find that a prospective defendant either had actual
' 33 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); United States v. Southeri,
Ry,, 364 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031 (1967); Getty Oil Co. (Eastern
Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del.), remanded, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
134 See, e.g., United States v. Southern Ry., 380 F.2d 49, 51 n.3 (4th Cir. 1967)
(regulation served on Association of American Railroads as agent for defendant and published
in the Federal Register, 28 Fed. Reg. 12,127 (1963)).
133 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1970).
139 See, e.g., 37 Fed. Reg. 10,846 (1970); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970):
[M]atter reasonably available to the class of persons affected thereby [implementa-
tion plans are kept up to date and available for public inspection at the respective
State and EPA Regional offices] is deemed pilblished in the Federal Register when
incorporated by reference therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal
Register.
137 See 37 Fed. Reg. 10,846 (1972). See also Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v.
Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006, 1013 (D. Del. 1972).
"a Compare Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947) (holder of
federal crop insurance held bound by regulations published in Federal Register and therefore
unable to recover crop loss even though government agent apparently misrepresented scope of
insurance coverage at time of, application for insurance), with Bellingham Bay & Co. v. New
Whatcom, 172 U.S. 314, 318-19 (1899) (if service of notice is by publication, that publication
must be of such a character as to create a reasonable presumption that the affected party will
receive information of what is proposed).
139 The notice issue may prove particularly crucial in criminal cases.
140 See text at notes 107-15 supra.
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knowledge or reason to know of the approval or promulgation of an
implementation plan in sufficient time to file a section 307
challenge. ' 41
The argument that a defendant in an enforcement action should
be able to defeat section 307's foreclosure of certain issues by estab-
lishing that he lacked the legal expertise to mount a timely challenge
to EPA approval or promulgation of a plan may not fare well in the
courts. None of the decisions supporting the type of review scheme
exemplified by section 307 turned on the existence of the defendant's
legal resources to utilize the special statutory proceeding. Further-
more, the determination of whether the defendant had adequate
legal resources is fraught with so many difficulties that courts will
probably be wary of examining the question. Finally, even if such
an issue is deemed relevant in determining the applicability of
section 307(b), it is unlikely to be urged successfully in any large
number of cases. Even where very limited resources are involved,
there is often a trade' association or other group that has the neces-
sary money and expertise to mount a timely section 307 challenge. 142
D. Circumvention of Section 307(b)
There are various procedural mechanisms and theories of action
that have been or could be advanced which, if accepted, would
severely limit the effectiveness, of section 307(b) in foreclosing issues
from review in the enforcement forum to the extent intended by
Congress. It is submitted that the courts should reject such argu-
ments as long as the prior opportunity for administrative and judi-
cial review of these issues was adequate. Several of these approaches
deserve close attention.
1. The question of the availability of pre-enforcement review
will be explored in the following section. 143 However, it is relevant
to note here that section 307(b)(2), by its express terms, deals with
foreclosure of review in civil and criminal "proceedings for
enforcement. >1144 Therefore, it might be argued that it does not
141
 A particularly difficult problem would arise, however, where the interpretation of a
regulation adopted by the regulatory agency was not obvious at the time of plan approval or
promulgation and is advanced for the first time in the enforcement action. In such a case, the
legality of the interpretation should, it seems, be open to litigation in the enforcement forum.
"3
 There is also a question of the adequacy of the length of time (30 days) for filing a §
307 challenge. Similarly, short notice periods have -been upheld in other circumstances where
property rights were at stake. See, e.g., Wick v. Chelan Elec. Co., 280 U.S. 108, 110 (1929)
(notice for condemnation proceedings affecting nonresidents given by newspaper in county
where land situated once a week for two weeks); Campbell v. Olney, 262 U.S. 352 (1923) (20
days notice to challenge improvement lien).
143 See text at notes 164-84 infra.
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (1970).
690
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970
preclude raising section 307 issues in a pre-enforcement forum. 145
To the extent that a court considers section 307 of doubtful constitu-
tionality, perhaps it will adopt such an argument in order to avoid
the constitutional question. However, the wisest thing for a court
having such an opinion to do would be to confront the constitutional
issue head-on and not to accept an interpretation which puts a
premium on the race to the courthouse. On the other hand, to the
extent that a court considers the enactment of section 307(b) to be
within Congress' power, it would certainly not allow pre-
enforcement review to undermine the purposes of that provision. 146
2. A state's enforcement of its own plan depends, at least
initially, on the legality of the state's adoption of the plan. However,
section 307(b)(2) does not on its face insulate the state's action in
adopting a plan; it protects only the Administrator's approval of the
plan, 147
 thus opening the possibility' of the plan's being invalidated
in a state enforcement action in state court. On the other hand,
federal and citizen enforcement of a state plan hinges on federal
approval of the plan. 148 Since, as indicated above, all issues of state
law presented by a state's adoption of a plan can be raised and
145 Note, 1973 Duke L.J. 253, 271-72 (1973). Ohe possible jurisdictional basis for such a
pre-enforcement challenge might be the provision for citizen suits, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a){2)
(1970) (authorization of suit against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure on his
part to perform an act or duty under the Act which is not discretionary). The ingenious
prospective defendant would, in many cases, have no trouble phrasing his arguments to come
within the terms of this provision though they would amount to a challenge to the validity of
the implementation plan. Already there are cases where parties have attempted, though
without success in some instances, to use this provision to raise § 307 issues prior to EPA
promulgation of a plan. See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973);
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 254 (D.D.C. 1972), affd, 4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C.
Cir.), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
In United States Steel Corp. v. Fri, 364 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (N.D. Ind, 1973), § 304 was
used by the court as the jurisdictional basis for a challenge to an EPA enforcement order
though the petitioner there was not raising § 307 issues. Id. at 1018 n.3. The danger of
permitting the use of § 304 to undermine § 307(b)(2) has been pointed out by several
commentators. See, e.g., Comment, The Aftermath of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970:
The Federal Courts and Air Pollution, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 724, 732-33 (1973). In
order to avoid this result, the pre-enforcement court must ask itself if the issues sought to be
raised could have been raised in a § 307 proceeding. If the answer to this question is in the
affirmative, it should refuse to permit them to be raised on the basis of the explicit language of
§ 307(b)(2) and its legislative history. Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(2) (1970) are,
in a sense, proceedings for enforcement, and therefore 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (1970), by its
express terms, applies thereto to prevent the raising of issues which could have been raised
earlier.
146 See Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del.),
remanded, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972),.'cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
147
 "Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained
. . shall not be subject to judicial review . .
	 ." 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (1970).
145
 Both federal and citizen enforcement attach to an "applicable implementation plan,"
see 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a) (1970), which is defined as a plan approved or promulgated by the
Administrator. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(d) (1970).
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decided in a section 307 challenge to that federal approva1, 149 sec-
tion 307 by its own terms (supported by its legislative history)
forecloses litigation of such issues in enforcement proceedings
brought by the EPA pursuant to section 113 15° and by private
citizens pursuant to section 304, 151 to the extent that they existed on
the date of plan approval. The anomalous result that issues touching
the legality of a state's adoption of a plan might be raised in state
enforcement suits but not in federal and citizen enforcement suits 152
can, however, be avoided. A state is a "person" within the meaning
of the citizen suit provision 153 and can therefore bring a civil action
in federal district court for injunctive relief against violators of its
federally approved plan 154 with the protection of section
307(b)(2). 155 This preserves the effectiveness of state and local en-
forcement efforts which Congress believed necessary to the attain-
ment of the air quality goals of the 1970 Amendments.'"
3. Finally, the recent decision in Buckeye Power, Inc. v.
EPA' 57 vacated in tato the EPA's approval of the. Ohio and Ken-
tucky implementation plans and, in doing so, adopted a line of
reasoning, which, if accepted by other courts, will seriously impair
149 See text at notes 123-29 supra.
150
 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (Supp. 11971).
15 ' 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-(b)(2) (1970). Invalidation of a state plan or part thereof in a
collateral state proceeding at the expiration of § 307's 30-day appeal period should not, it is
submitted, be construed as constituting grounds arising after the original 30-day appeal period
of § 307 and thus reopening the possibility of a § 307 challenge.
152
 This, of course, assumes that state law does not contain provisions comparable to 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (1970).
153 See 42 U.S.C. § 1857h(e) (1970).
' 54
 See Luneburg, supra note 122, at 662-64.
Even if the standing requirements of Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
(plaintiff must show that he himself or those he represents suffered or will suffer personal
injury), are interpreted to apply to § 304 suits, a state enforcing a plan against sources within
its borders and thereby protecting its citizens and the air resources of the state has the
requisite interest to establish its right to bring suit. See, e.g., United States v. United States
Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556, 558 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (Illinois has standing to sue under federal
common law to restrain discharge of waste water into Lake Michigan from defendant's plant
located in Waukegan, Illinois, given the interest of the state and its citizens in the purity and
recreational value of Lake Michigan); Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060
(D. Md. 1972). For an analysis of the U.S. Steel decision and discussion of a state's standing
to protect its natural resources, see Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 795 (1974).
' 55 See note 57 supra.
154
 It of course follows from the discussion in the text that a state court invalidation of a
plan in a suit other than an enforcement suit after the time has expired for EPA approval and
promulgation of plans should have no effect on federal, state or citizen enforcement unless the
invalidation is based on grounds arising after the 30-day period of § 307 has elapsed, in which
case a new § 307 challenge can be filed. See also note 151 supra. As indicated in note 33
supra, both federal and state courts would have jurisdiction over enforcement suits brought
by states pursuant to § 304. The language and legislative history of the provisions show an
intent that § 307(b)(2) apply to proceedings regardless of the court in which suit is brought.
157
 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973).
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the capacity of section 307(b) to eliminate issues from the enforce-
ment court's consideration.
The Buckeye Power court ignored the fact that the public
hearings at the state level on the plans may have supplied sufficient
opportunity for public comment to.satisfy the informal rule-making
requirements of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act"' to the
extent that that statute is applicable to the implementation plan
process. It remanded the plans to the EPA for further proceedings
consistent with those requirements—that is, issuance of a notice of
proposed rule-making, solicitation of public comments, and state-
ment of the bases and purposes for the rule eventually
promulgated.'" Adjudicatory hearings on the petitioners' claims of
high cost-benefit, technological infeasibility of compliance, and re-
source unavailability were held to be unncessary prior to plan
approval.'" Yet, almost in the same breath, the court asserted its
belief that the informal rule-making procedures would not be ade-
quate to provide a forum for petitioners' claims."' Thus it reached
the startling result that the petitioners' claims could be raised in
enforcement actions which might be brought against them. 162
It is submitted that since the court apparently believed that
adjudicatory hearings were necessary to fairly resolve the issues
raised, it should have required them before the EPA approved the
plans and not have delayed them until the enforcement stage. The
Administrative Procedure Act sets' down only the bare minimum
procedural requirements for various types of administrative action.
It is to be hoped that the badly reasoned opinion in Buckeye Power
will not spawn progeny. If followed in other cases, it would severely
erode the protection which section 307(b) attempts to give to the
mandatory three-year deadline for attaining healthful air quality
levels and the mechanism for citizen enforcement established by the
1970 Clean Air Amendments. 163
15" 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
15" 481 F.2d at 171, 174,
16° Id. at 172-73.
16 ' Id. at 173.
162
 The court relied on 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970), which provides in pertinent part: "Except
to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by
law, agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial
enforcement." That provision merely restates the principle laid down in Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), that, absent a prior adequate opportunity for judicial review, a
defendant can challenge the legality of administrative action at the enforcement level. Section
307 review can provide prior adequate review which, by the express terms of the statute, is
made the exclusive opportunity for raising certain issues.
16 :1
 The availability of habeas corpus, or of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) (post conviction relief
for federal prisoners), to raise issues foreclosed by § 307(b)(2) in enforcement proceedings has
not been examined, given the unlikelihood of enforcement cases resulting in the imprisonment
of violators.
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III. PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
There are issues that may be raised prior to enforcement pro-
ceedings. Four different situations can 'arise in which pre-
enforcement judicial review may be sought: (1) judicial review
sought after federal regulations are proposed but prior to promulga-
tion; (2) judicial review sought after regulations are promulgated but
before any enforcement proceeding is commenced; (3) judicial re-
view sought within thirty days of the Administrator's notification to
a party of a violation; and (4) judicial review sought after an
administrative order has been issued.
In deciding whether judicial review will be granted, a court will
determine whether administrative remedies have been exhausted,'"
whether the controversy is ripe for review,'" and whether the
parties have standing. 166
 Additionally, judicial review will be de-
nied if a statute precludes review, 167
 if the agency action • is
discretionary,' 68
 or if a special statutory review proceeding is
available. 169
Where judicial review is sought after proposal but before
promulgation of •regulations under the Act, a plaintiff might be
seeking a declaratory judgment that the proposed regulations are
invalid. Review should be denied in this situation.'" A proposed
regulation does not injure the plaintiff, and there is no certainty that
it will ever be brought to bear against him. Hearings are held on
proposed regulations in which interested parties can express their
views; thus, if a plaintiff pursued this avenue, the proposed regula-
tion might be amended in such a way that plaintiff would be
satisfied with it. It is a principle of ripeness for review that "[j]udi-
cial machinery should be conserved for problems which are real and
present or imminent, not squandered on problems which are . . .
hypothetical or remote."' 71
 In the event that the objectionable regu-
lation is promulgated, plaintiff has a statutory remedy - under section
307.
A second type of pre-enforcement litigation can arise after the
approval or promulgation of a regulation but before an enforcement
164
 McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
163
	 Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
166
 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101-06 (1968).
167 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1970).
166 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
169 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970).
170 In Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1307. (10th Cir: 1973), the court
dismissed a suit brought on a regulation at the proposal stage. See also Utah Intl, Inc. v.
EPA, 478 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1973); Arizona Pub. Serv. v. Fri, 5 E.R.C. 1878 (D. Ariz.
1973).
171 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 21.01, at 116 (1958).
694
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970
proceeding under section 113 has been commenced. This situation
could arise where a plaintiff is undertaking clean-up action with
state or local sanction but before EPA approval of the compliance
plan. The plaintiff might want to compel the Administrator to act
by approving the plan or by giving notice of violation before large
sums of money are invested. In this situation, limited review should
be granted. The plaintiff is not asking the court to make substantive
determinations as to the suitability of the compliance plan, but
rather is seeking to, compel the Administrator to perform his statu-
tory duty. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 172
 the Supreme Court
ruled that review was proper where plaintiff drug manufacturers
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against regulations promul-
gated by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs before enforcement
proceedings were brought on the grounds that the impact of the
regulations on plaintiffs was immediate (they could comply with the
regulation or risk prosecution) and that plaintiffs would suffer hard-
ship if review was withheld.'" Thus, in this second situation,
review generally ought to be granted unless the plaintiff is not really
suffering substantial Iharm by the Administrator's failure to act (as in
a situation where only minimal amounts have been invested). Sub-
stantive section 307 issues as to the validity of the plan are also
precluded. The reason the Administrator may not issue a com-
pliance order early enough is because of manpower limitation. Hav-
ing to defend against suits seeking to compel action will only further
deplete manpower resources, thus making it harder for the congres-
sional three-year implementation goa1 174
 to be achieved.'"
In the third situation, the party has been notified of a violation
by the Administrator but the thirty day limit for compliance has not•
expired. During the thirty day period, the Administrator must offer
to hold an informal conference with the violator if he is to issue an
order. 176 Judicial review should be ,denied to a plaintiff after notice
is issued, but before the conference; is held, because until that time,
all administrative remedies have not been exhausted.'" At the
conference, the notified party might bring forth facts that would
induce the Administrator to drop the proceedings or to work out an
172
 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
173
 Id. at 149.
174
 H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1970).
175
 Under § 304 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3857h-2 (1970), a citizen might bring an action to
compel the Administrator to issue a notice of violation. But see United States Steel Corp. v.
Fri, 364 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Commonwealth v. Fri, 262 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Ky.
1973), which view the initiation of enforcement action as discretionary on the Administrator's
part.
06
 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(4) (1970).
177
 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-52 (1938).
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acceptable compromise, in which case premature litigation could be
avoided. "8
 Some courts might not require that the conference pro-
cedure be exhausted before granting review, on the grounds that the
conference procedure fails to satisfy procedural due .process re-
quirements. There is a general rule that administrative remedies
need not be exhausted if they are inadequate.'" The conference
provided for by the Clean Air Act might not satisfy procedural due
process requirements, as no rules are set down describing conference
procedure, there is no cross-examination (though the violator may be
represented by counsel), no formal report of his findings need be
issued by the Administrator, and the conference is not an adjudica-
tory hearing as defined in the Administrative Procedure Act.'"
Once the conference has been held or when it is shown there
will be no conference, the case is ripe for judicial review, as ad-
ministrative procedures have been exhausted. The violator has
standing under Abbott Laboratories, in that he has the choice of
complying or risking criminal penalties.' 81
 In any event, issues
which could have been raised in a section 307 proceeding should be
precluded here. Plaintiff may raise arguments that the implementa-
tion plan was improperly interpreted in applying it against him, that
the engineering calculations are in error, or that procedural re-
quirements of section 113 were not followed by the Administrator.
The fourth pre-enforcement review situation occurs where the
enforcement order has been issued. This situation is ripe for judicial
review under the Abbott Laboratories standard, as the Agency has
taken its final action on the matter, and the plaintiff is subject to
criminal penalties for noncompliance. Section . 307 issues are pre-
cluded. Issues which can be raised include questions concerning
determination by the EPA of the violation, the adequacy of the
conference procedure, whether the violation continued beyond the
thirtieth day after notice, good faith efforts to comply by the plain-
tiff, the seriousness of the violation, and the explicit terms of the
order. Also, plaintiff may question whether the Administrator com-
plied with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act' 82
in carrying out the enforcement scheme.
In determining whether a stay of execution should be granted
pending the outcome of the litigation, the plaintiff must satisfy four
178 See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969).
"9
 Id. at 199; Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 625 (1945).
' 8° 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970).
18 ' For a first offense, knowing violation of an order, penalties of up to 825,000 per day
of violation in fines and up to one year in prison may be imposed. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(1)(13)
(1970).
18 ' 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
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criteria. 183 First, there must be strong likelihood he will succeed on
the merits. This will depend on the facts of each case. Second,
irreparable harm must be threatened. The threat of criminal sanc-
tion has been held to satisfy this criterion.'" Next, there must be no
harm to other parties in granting the stay. Harm could arise here in
that delay to urgently needed abatement of air pollution programs
will result, disabling the EPA in its effort to comply with the
three-year statutory deadline. Finally, the stay must be in the public
interest. Delays could contravene the public interest in achieving
clean air as quickly as possible. A court will have to weigh all these
factors in deciding whether equity weighs in favor of granting a stay
of execution.
CONCLUSION
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 permit judicial review of
various issues prior to the commencement of enforcement action.
Generally section 307(b) provides an adequate opportunity for the
litigation of those issues which pertain to the validity of air im-
plementation plans approved or promulgated by the EPA. Its fore-
closure of judicial review of such issues at the enforcement stage
raises no'serious constitutional problems. The courts have correctly
remitted parties to review proceedings pursuant to that provision
where they sought to attack agency action which had not become
final. They thereby prevented premature interruptions of the ad-
ministrative process. When squarely presented with the question of
the constitutionality of section 307, the courts have so far upheld the
protection to swift and effective enforcement action which it affords,
though the recent Buckeye Power, case threatens erosion of that
safeguard.
While section 307 provides for only a limited opportunity for
judicial review of certain issues affecting air implementation plans,
the availability of pre-enforcement review of non-section 307 issues
in at least several instances seems clear. Fairness to the prospective
defendants demands such review in these cases, though it may
interfere somewhat with speedy enforcement action.
As time progresses and more courts are confronted with the
problems dealt with in this article, it is to be hoped that they will
strive to arrive at solutions which will minimize delay in the attain-
ment of healthful air quality levels and which, at the same time, will
afford defendants and prospective defendants the due process under
law to which they are entitled.
I " See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1967).
184 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
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